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RAPE, TORTURE AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
CLARE MCGLYNN*
Abstract This article examines the legacy of the ground-breaking judgment
in Aydin v Turkey in which the European Court of Human Rights held that
rape could constitute torture. Ten years on, it examines jurisprudential de-
velopments in the conceptualisation of torture in the speciﬁc context of the
offence of rape. It is argued that while all rapes should be found to satisfy the
minimum threshold for Article 3, rape does not per se satisfy the severity of
harm criterion for torture. Nonetheless, where the severity of harm is estab-
lished, the case is made that the purposive element of torture is satisﬁed in all
cases of rape. Finally, in relation to the scope of State responsibility for rape,
particularly by private individuals, the article suggests that while the Court’s
achievements in recognizing rape as a serious harm are considerable, there
remain further avenues for jurisprudential development which would ensure
that rape as a form of torture is recognized in a wider range of situations and
circumstances than is currently the case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Just over ten years ago the European Court of Human Rights issued the
ground-breaking judgment in Aydin v Turkey.1 For the ﬁrst time, it recognized
that an act of rape could constitute torture. This progressive judgment was
hailed across the international community for its acknowledgement of the
urgent need to develop legal mechanisms, particularly human rights norms, to
bring perpetrators of sexual violence to justice. Further, its reinforcement of
State liability for acts of rape was to have ramiﬁcations both within the
jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights and beyond.
Indeed, not long after the judgment in Aydin v Turkey, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its landmark judgment in
Prosecutor v Akayesu ﬁnding responsibility for genocide and war crimes
* Professor of Law, Durham Law School, DurhamUniversity. clare.mcglynn@durham.ac.uk. I
should like to thank a number of colleagues and friends who have given very generously of their
time to discuss the ideas in this article, including Neil Cobb, Alice Edwards, Erika Rackley,
Colin Warbrick, Nicole Westmarland, Celia Wells and particularly Sonia Harris-Short and Ian
Ward who both commented on earlier drafts of this work. The comments of the anonymous
referees were of great assistance and my ﬁnal thanks are due to Claire Crockford, Xavier
L’Hoiry and Anna Shadbolt for their helpful research assistance.
1 Aydin v Turkey (1998) 25 EHRR 251.
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based on rape.2 Approximately ten years on, the time is ripe to review the
legacy of Aydin v Turkey.
Since Aydin v Turkey there have been further developments in the European
Court’s jurisprudence on torture and on the applicability of the Convention to
the crime of rape. In recent years, however, the ‘torture debates’ have gener-
ally focused on the validity of torture itself, predominantly in the context of
growing national security concerns and the so-called ‘war on terror’, leaving
the boundaries and outer limits of the Aydin v Turkey ruling on the appli-
cability of torture protections to rape unclear.3 In relation to the speciﬁc of-
fence of rape, debate has tended to centre on the implications of Convention
jurisprudence for substantive deﬁnitions of rape and criminal justice pro-
cesses, most recently following the judgment inMC v Bulgaria, again leaving
the scope of the torture prohibition largely unresolved.4 This latter focus of
attention is justiﬁed on the basis that to address the prevalence of rape, inad-
equate investigations and low conviction rates, it is crucial to ensure that states
meet their positive obligations. Nonetheless, the scope of the torture prohib-
ition remains signiﬁcant on a general level, in view of the rhetorical and
political impact of ﬁndings of torture, as well as for the individual, with the
possibility of higher damages.
Accordingly, the aim of this article is to review the legacy of Aydin v Turkey
by analyzing the Convention’s torture provisions, speciﬁcally in relation to the
offence of rape. Having outlined Aydin v Turkey and its immediate impact
in section II below, section III considers whether any or all rapes satisfy the
minimum level of severity to come within the scope of the Convention’s
Article 3 protection of inhuman or degrading treatment, followed by an
analysis of the torture threshold of severe harm. Section IV examines the
‘purposive’ requirement for torture, with particular reference to debates on
whether rapes, and other forms of sexual violence, automatically satisfy this
element on the basis of their discriminatory intent. The responsibility of the
State for rape, and particularly the attribution of responsibility where there is
apparent consent or acquiescence, is considered in section V. Finally, section
VI concludes that there are grounds for hoping that the European Court may
2 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case no ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998.
3 See, for example, the Special Issue on Torture in (2006) 2 EHRLR, the Special Issue ‘Law
as Cruelty: Torture as an International Crime’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice
157 and the debates surrounding attempts by the UK, and other governments, to review the
Court’s absolute protection from deportation to face torture or ill-treatment established in Chahal
v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413 and reiterated again in Saadi v Italy (Judgment) (37201/06) (28
February 2008).
4 MC v Bulgaria [2003] ECHR 646. See for example: I Radacic, ‘Rape Cases in the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Deﬁning Rape and Determining the Scope
of the State’s Obligations’ (2008) 3 EHRLR 357; C Pitea, ‘Rape as a Human Rights Violation and
a Criminal Offence: the European Court’s Judgment in MC v Bulgaria’ (2005) 3 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 447; P Londono, ‘Positive Obligations, Criminal Procedure and
Rape Cases’ (2007) 2 EHRLR 158.
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yet pursue a progressive agenda in treating rape as torture, by making such a
ﬁnding in a wider range of circumstances than has hitherto been the case.
To this end, this article examines the current approach of the European
Court to interpreting the torture prohibition in Article 3. This is not to suggest
that Article 3, or the Court’s jurisprudence, is ideal or adequate. Indeed,
feminist critique has established the gendered nature of torture prohibitions
internationally and has generated compelling agendas for the wholesale reform
and re-imagining of torture prohibitions and human rights generally, in order
to better protect women, particularly, from sexual violence.5 In contrast to
such fundamental and ultimately reconstructive approaches, this article con-
centrates on analysing and seeking re-interpretation of the existing deﬁnition
and jurisprudence on rape and torture. In doing so, it provides a clear example
of the ways in which States’ human rights obligations are changing and
developing, towards greater responsibility for harms caused by private indi-
viduals. Andrew Clapham suggests that this ‘rethinking’ of the human rights
obligations of States particularly demands that we ‘reconﬁgure traditional
approaches to violence against women’ and this article attempts to suggest
ways of doing so.6 The ambition is that if we expand the boundaries of
Article 3, we may better ensure justice for victims of rape.7
II. AYDIN V TURKEY: BREAKING NEW GROUND
In Aydin v Turkey a 17-year-old woman was raped by a member of the Turkish
security forces. Sukran Aydin had been taken into custody, ostensibly as part
of a security operation, to gain information from her and other members of her
family about supposed terrorist activities or sympathies. Her forcible deten-
tion lasted three days, during which time she was repeatedly beaten, sprayed
with water whilst naked and, when blindfolded, raped. This was the ﬁrst time
that Aydin had had sexual intercourse and, following her experiences, she
suffered long-term psychological after-effects. Just two years after its ﬁrst
ever ﬁnding of torture,8 the Court was asked to consider whether her treat-
ment, including the rape, amounted to torture under Article 3 of the European
Convention which provides that: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ The Court held that:
Rape of a detainee by an ofﬁcial of the State must be considered to be an
especially grave and abhorrent form of ill-treatment given the ease with which
the offender can exploit the vulnerability and weakened resistance of his victim.
Furthermore, rape leaves deep psychological scars on the victim which do not
5 See A Edwards, ‘The “Feminizing” of Torture under International Human Rights Law’
(2006) 19 Leiden J of Intl L 349 and citations therein.
6 A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP, Oxford, 2006) 1.
7 While this analysis focuses on rape, it has implications for all forms of sexual violence.
8 Aksoy v Turkey [1996] ECHR 68.
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respond to the passage of time as quickly as other forms of physical and mental
violence. The applicant also experienced the acute physical pain of forced pen-
etration, which must have left her feeling debased and violated both physically
and emotionally.9
The Court continued that, as well as the harm of the rape, the other treatment
she suffered amounted to a ‘series of particularly terrifying and humiliating
experiences’, especially having regard to her ‘sex and youth and the circum-
stances in which she was held’.10 Moreover, the suffering inﬂicted upon her
by the security forces was ‘for a purpose’, namely to elicit information.11
Against this background, the Court found that:
The accumulation of acts of physical and mental violence inﬂicted on the ap-
plicant and the especially cruel act of rape to which she was subjected amount to
torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed the Court would have
reached this conclusion on either of these grounds taken separately.12
This was a remarkable and progressive decision. A ﬁnding that the rape, in
and of itself, was sufﬁcient to constitute torture, marked a very clear departure
from the previous approach of the European Commission in Cyprus v Turkey
which had dismissed the suggestion of torture despite evidence of mass rape
by security forces.13 But the context had changed. Aydin v Turkey was handed
down at a time when public consciousness about the prevalence and egregious
nature of rape in conﬂict zones had been heightened, especially in Europe with
the conﬂict in the former Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, the Court’s judgment did
presage those of the international tribunals established to deal with the con-
ﬂicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and their epoch-making judgments regarding
gendered violence. The Court must therefore be credited for its recognition of
the serious and harmful nature of rape, symbolized in the torture ﬁnding.
Even so, there were elements of the judgment which gave cause for con-
cern. In particular, the Court appeared to emphasise the ‘sex and youth’ of the
victim as particularly important, as well as highlighting that the acts had taken
place in State detention and had been perpetrated by a State actor. While this
was (and still is) the paradigmatic approach to constituting torture, it also
raised the prospect of rendering the impact of Aydin v Turkey little more than
symbolic: most rapes are perpetrated by private individuals against other pri-
vate individuals and not therefore in State detention.
However, in the years following Aydin v Turkey, the Court’s jurisprudence
has developed in signiﬁcant and important ways which have expanded the
reach of human rights protections beyond paradigmatic examples of state
coercion. Most notably in the ﬁeld of rape, the doctrine of positive obligations
has been deployed to great effect to bring to account state failures regarding
the investigation and prosecution of previously marginalized forms of rape,
9 Aydin v Turkey (n 1) para 83. 10 ibid para 84. 11 ibid para 85.
12 ibid para 86. 13 Cyprus v Turkey (1982) 4 EHRR 482.
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particularly acquaintance rapes.14 In this way, the concept of positive ob-
ligations has enabled the Court to hold states liable for breaches of human
rights in a far greater range of circumstances than had hitherto been the case.15
Most particularly, it has facilitated a means by which harms by private in-
dividuals have been held to account, where a failure to take action by the state
has, in practice, facilitated the breach. This expanding jurisprudence, bringing
‘non-state actors’ to account for their human rights abuses, is particularly
signiﬁcant for victims of sexual violence.
But this does not necessarily mean that the Convention’s protection of rape,
and particularly rape as torture, has expanded. Indeed, at the same time that
the scope of the concept of positive obligations and the responsibilities of
non-state actors has been expanding, the Court has been setting clearer, more
speciﬁc, and arguably more limiting, criteria necessary for a ﬁnding of torture.
These developments in torture jurisprudence provide new challenges for those
seeking to establish rape as torture. It is to these developments, and therefore
an assessment of the overall impact of Aydin v Turkey on the conceptualiz-
ation of rape as torture, that the following sections now turn.
III. RAPE, HARM AND THE TORTURE THRESHOLD
There are a number of different criteria which must be established before the
Court will determine that a particular act or acts constitute torture, including
the ‘purpose’ of the acts, the level of ‘state responsibility’ and the status of the
perpetrator/s. Preliminary, however, to each of these considerations are the
threshold questions of, ﬁrst, the minimum requirements to fall within Article 3
and, secondly, the level of harm necessary to establish torture. Not only are
these essential pre-conditions for a ﬁnding of torture, but they are also funda-
mental issues which reveal much about how the Court conceptualizes ques-
tions of harm and human rights, for example its relative insistence on physical
or psychological harm and its development of Convention jurisprudence
beyond the foundational attention on state-centric, public-oriented forms of
abuse. These threshold questions also raise key concerns for feminist scholars
and activists as they involve controversial matters of comparability among
rapes and of appropriate strategies to bring perpetrators to justice. Finally, and
most obviously, these threshold issues determine, for an applicant, the ad-
missibility of their claim and levels of any damages.
Turning, therefore, to the ﬁrst question, namely whether the particular rape,
or indeed all rapes, satisfy the minimum requirements of Article 3, the Court
has stated that for conduct to fall within Article 3, in general, it must ‘attain
a minimum level of severity’.16 It has further, repeatedly, opined that the
14 MC v Bulgaria (n 4).
15 For example, Costello-Roberts [1993] ECHR 16.
16 Ireland v UK (1979–80) 2 EHRR 25 para 162.
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assessment of this minimum is ‘relative’ depending on ‘all the circumstances
of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim’.17 In
this way, the Court maintains ﬂexibility in the application of Article 3. Its
approach is conceptual, outlining the broad purpose and scope of the pro-
vision, rather than providing an exhaustive list of modalities; thereby pro-
viding ﬂexibility, but also indeterminacy. Once this minimum threshold has
been reached, the Court then considers whether the conduct constitutes tor-
ture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, according to a hierarchy
of severity, with torture being the most serious, followed by inhuman and then
degrading treatment or punishment.18
In relation to the offence of rape, it is clear that rape can satisfy the mini-
mum threshold of severity to come within Article 3. This much has been clear
since the 1970s when the applicability of Article 3 to acts of rape was ﬁrst
considered in the context of the Turkey–Cyprus conﬂict. In reporting on the
complaints of mass rape of Greek Cypriot women by the Turkish forces,
the European Commission found that there was evidence of rape by Turkish
soldiers, which were not isolated acts of indiscipline, and that the Turkish
authorities had failed to take adequate measures to either prevent the rapes
or to take subsequent disciplinary action.19 It went on to hold that, as a con-
sequence, there had been a breach of Article 3, namely that the rapes con-
stituted ‘inhuman treatment’.20 For now, the important aspect of this ﬁrst
case is that the rapes under consideration satisﬁed the minimum level of
severity to come within Article 3 which established that rape can come within
Article 3. The next question is whether all, and any rape, satisﬁes the mini-
mum threshold.
Since Cyprus v Turkey, a number of cases involving rape have come before
the Court, each giving important indications of its approach. In X and Y v
the Netherlands the Court held that the failure of Dutch law to proscribe the
sexual violence of mentally disabled persons fell within, and breached,
Article 8 on the right to private life.21 When faced with a challenge to the
criminalization of marital rape under Article 7 of the Convention, the Court
was clear in its condemnation of rape, in all forms, referring to the ‘essentially
debasing character of rape’ which it deemed ‘so manifest’ and, furthermore,
that the immunity of husbands was not in conformity with the ‘fundamental
17 Moldovan v Romania [2005] ECHR 458 para 100.
18 For a criticism of this hierarchical, or ‘vertical’, approach, see Malcolm Evans ‘Getting to
Grips with Torture’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 365.
19 Cyprus v Turkey (n 13) paras 371–374.
20 There was no ﬁnding of torture, despite the evidence of mass rape, often committed with
extreme violence and the evidence that the rapes were directed against Greek Cypriots, by Turkish
forces, because of the differences in ethnic origin: Cyprus v Turkey, ibid, discussed in L Zilli, ‘The
Crime of Rape in the Case Law of the Strasbourg Institutions’ (2002) 13 Criminal Law Forum
245, 250–251. 21 X and Y v the Netherlands [1985] ECHR 4.
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objectives of the Convention, the very essence of which is respect for human
dignity and freedom’.22
Such cases identify the seriousness with which the offence of rape is
approached in Convention jurisprudence generally. Speciﬁcally in relation to
Article 3, in E and others v the UK the Court held that there was ‘no doubt’
that the rape, sexual abuse and violent assaults of a step-father on his young
step-children fell within Article 3.23 Nonetheless, the existence of many ag-
gravating features of this case, the repeated abuse and victimization of young
people, do not deﬁnitively tell us whether any rape, and therefore all rapes,
will come within Article 3.
Perhaps this debate has been answered by the judgment inMC v Bulgaria.24
In this case, the Court held that the failure of Bulgarian law to provide
the necessary protection for victims of rape where there was no evidence of
physical resistance by the victim, constituted a violation of the positive ob-
ligations of States under Article 3. In particular, it held that states have a
positive obligation, inherent in Articles 3 and 8, to ‘enact criminal-law pro-
visions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through ef-
fective investigation and prosecution’.25 This suggests that as a failure in law
to proscribe all forms of rape violates the positive obligations inherent in
Article 3 any rape will constitute ill-treatment of sufﬁcient severity to meet the
threshold requirements of Article 3. In particular, the rape at issue in MC v
Bulgaria was of a type often not taken seriously and wrongly assumed to be of
less harm and consequence than stranger-rapes, namely an ‘acquaintance
rape’ involving little physical violence or resistance. That the Court still found
that this form of rape requires the protection of Article 3 implies that any rape
will satisfy the minimum requirements for Article 3.
This is undoubtedly the correct approach, both in terms of the empirical
evidence of the harm of rape and the seriousness of the wrong of rape in
violating the sexual autonomy of individuals. In relation to the harm necessary
to come within Article 3, it is signiﬁcant that the Court recognises that what
constitutes harm extends far beyond physical injury.26 Many rapes do not
entail severe physical injury and any that there is may be short-lived. But
this does not mean that the rape is not injurious; it is that the wounds are
psychological. Evidence suggests enduring and serious adverse effects of
rape, with studies ﬁnding, for example, a high rate of post-traumatic stress
disorder in rape victims.27 One study of victims concluded that: ‘Rape is
22 SW & CR v UK [1995] ECHR 52 para 44.
23 E v the UK, application no 33218/96, 26 November 2002, para 89.
24 MC v Bulgaria (n 4). 25 ibid para 153.
26 The Court conﬁrmed in Dikme v Turkey that assaults causing mental suffering ‘may fall
within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention even though they may not necessarily leave
medically certiﬁable physical or psychological scars’: [2000] ECHR 366, para 80.
27 For a discussion of this research, see J Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process, (2nd edn, OUP,
Oxford, 2002) 2.
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an experience which shakes the foundations of the lives of the victims. For
many its effect is a long-term one, impairing their capacity for personal re-
lationships, altering their behaviour and values and generating fear’.28 Added
to this weight of evidence is research establishing that many acquaintance
rapes can actually be as traumatic, if not more, than the archetypal stranger-
rape due to the breach of trust by, say, family member, partner, friend or
colleague.29 In other words, all rapes, and not just violent, stranger rapes, can
result in serious, adverse and long-term consequences for victims.
Were the European Court to hold that a rape does not satisfy the minimum
threshold for the protection of Article 3, it would also be failing to recognize
that the seriousness of rape lies in its violation of sexual autonomy, a funda-
mental value to be protected by human rights norms and instruments.
Emblematic of this recognition is the statement from the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that: ‘The Trial Chamber
considers the rape of any person to be a despicable act which strikes at the
very core of human dignity and physical integrity.’30 Accordingly, it seems
reasonably clear that the Court rightly considers that any rape satisﬁes the
minimum threshold for Article 3.
On the assumption that all rapes do satisfy the minimum threshold for
Article 3, the next and more complex question is which rapes, if not all,
constitute torture? To examine this issue, we must turn to the Court’s juris-
prudence on torture and in particular the threshold issue: the factors which
determine the difference between inhuman and degrading treatment, and
torture.
The Court initially set the threshold for torture extremely high. In Ireland v
UK the Court found that the interrogation practices under consideration, such
as sleep and food deprivation, stress positions and hooding, did not amount to
conduct sufﬁciently severe to be deserving of the sobriquet torture.31 Indeed,
it was not until 1996 that the Court made its ﬁrst ﬁnding of torture in Aksoy
v Turkey.32 In this case, the Court emphasized the importance of Article 3
stating that it ‘enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic
society’.33 It went on to state that the distinction embodied in the Convention
between inhuman and degrading treatment and torture had been included to
allow the ‘special stigma of “torture” to attach only to deliberate inhuman
treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering’.34 The treatment in Aksoy,
including ‘Palestinian hanging’, was said to have caused ‘severe pain’ which
was long lasting and appeared to have been ‘administered with the aim of
28 W Young, Rape Study—A Discussion of Law and Practice, (Wellington, New Zealand:
Department of Justice, 1983) 34, discussed in Temkin, ibid 1–3.
29 V Wiehe and A Richards, Intimate Betrayal: Understanding and Responding to the
Trauma of Acquaintance Rape (London, Sage, 1995).
30 Prosecutor v Delalic, Judgment, IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para 495.
31 Ireland v UK (1979–80) 2 EHRR 25. 32 Aksoy v Turkey (n 8) para 62.
33 ibid. 34 ibid para 63.
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obtaining admissions or information’.35 The Court concluded that ‘this treat-
ment was of such a serious and cruel nature that it can only be described as
torture’.36 Thus, Aksoy v Turkey delivered a clear statement that there is an
unambiguous distinction between conduct which constitutes inhuman or de-
grading treatment and that which comes within ‘torture’.37
Applying Aksoy v Turkey, the question becomes, is rape of such a ‘serious
and cruel nature that it can only be described as torture’? The answer of the
ICTY is ‘obviously’.38 To explain more fully, it has stated that: ‘[S]ome acts
establish per se the suffering of those upon whom they are inﬂicted. Rape is
obviously such an act.’39 Consequently, [‘s]evere pain or suffering, as re-
quired by the deﬁnition of the crime of torture, can . . . be said to be estab-
lished once rape has been proved’.40 Such an approach has the beneﬁt of
simplicity: it always being clear that once rape has been established, the harm
threshold for torture has been satisﬁed. It may obviate intrusive questioning of
victims regarding the impact of the rape and its adverse effects. It may also
ensure that the egregious nature of rape is better recognized, being assimilated
with torture. For these reasons and more, it is an approach widely rec-
ommended by many feminist scholars.
Catharine MacKinnon, for example, has written powerfully of the violence
which women suffer in the form of rape, asking ‘why is torture on the basis of
sex—for example, in the form of rape, battering, and pornography—not seen as
a violation of human rights?’41 She castigates the international community for
failing to see violence against women as sufﬁciently serious and political to
constitute torture and advocates a reconceptualization of rape as torture.42 Her
argument, followed by many others,43 is that characterizing rape as torture
would both acknowledge the serious harm that is rape, as well as drawing on the
‘recognized proﬁle’44 of torture internationally, garnering national and inter-
national recognition of the egregious nature of all violence against women.
35 ibid para 64. 36 ibid.
37 The Court did highlight other factors, such as the purpose of the treatment, namely for
‘obtaining admissions or information’: Aksoy v Turkey (n 8) para 64. Further, the status of the
perpetrators was also likely to prove important, namely that the conduct in question was ad-
ministered by the Turkish security forces in detention. These criteria are discussed further below.
38 Prosecutor v Kunarac, (IT-96-23&23/1) Appeals Chamber, 20 June 2002, para 150.
39 Kunarac, ibid paras 150–151.
40 ibid. This has been afﬁrmed in Braanin where it was said that rape is an act which ‘appears
by deﬁnition to meet the severity threshold’: Braanin (IT-99-36) Trial Chamber, 1 September
2004, para 485.
41 C MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 2006) 17, reproduced from her earlier essay ‘On Torture: A Feminist
Perspective on Human Rights’, in KMahoney and PMahoney (eds),Human Rights in the Twenty-
ﬁrst Century: A Global Challenge (The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992) 21.
42 Further discussed in C McGlynn, ‘Rape as “Torture”: Catharine MacKinnon and Questions
of Feminist Strategy’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 71.
43 For example, in the speciﬁc Convention context, Ivana Radacic has argued that the Court
should make clear that ‘any rape’ reaches the level of severity for a ﬁnding of torture (n 4) 363.
44 ibid (n 41) 17.
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The contrary argument has been made by Karen Engle who argues that the
ICTY’s approach has ‘reinforced the understanding that women are not cap-
able of not being victimized by rapes’.45 The danger of such an approach, she
argues, is that it reiﬁes the harm of rape, essentializing women’s experiences
as all constituting severe harm. While for many rape survivors, the rape has
ruined their lives, threatened their livelihood through wrecking their well-
being and destroyed the security and comfort that they took for granted in their
lives; for others, it is serious, harmful, painful, and they move on.46 Over-
generalizing the trauma of rape, the argument goes, may add to the perception
of rape as exceptional, as especially dreadful and to be feared: to be a ‘fate
worse than death’. Perhaps, Engle asks, ‘feminist advocates should ask
whether rape is really a fate worse than death’.47
This approach to differentiating between the harms of rape arguably reﬂects
the fact that most legal systems recognize different forms of rape, para-
digmatically child or ‘statutory’ rape, and take into account the varied con-
texts in which rape takes place, impacting for example on the sentencing of
perpetrators.48 Considering the issue of rape as torture, and to take just one
example, rape by a State ofﬁcial may not be very different, from the victim’s
perspective, from rape by a private individual, but from society’s perspective
it may be more egregious. The State ofﬁcial is someone who is speciﬁcally
responsible for upholding the law, someone to whom women should be able to
turn for protection. Further, the consequences of State involvement may be
more pernicious, with the possibility that the investigation, prosecution and
punishment of the perpetrator may be compromised, if not entirely impeded.
Thus, it may be that from a societal perspective, rape by a State ofﬁcial may be
an aggravated form of rape, possibly impacting on sentencing and also poss-
ibly aggravating the conduct, bringing it within a threshold of severity for
torture.49 In other words, there is an argument that not all rapes should be
treated the same as constituting the severe harm necessary for a ﬁnding of
torture.
To return to the discussion about the threshold for torture under Convention
jurisprudence and Aydin v Turkey, it is clear that the Court has not taken the
approach that rape per se constitutes the severity of harm for torture. Indeed, it
has introduced a number of possible features and characteristics which appear
to be relevant to a determination of the torture threshold including the place
45 K Engle, ‘Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalising Wartime Rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina’ (2005) 99 AJIL 778, 813.
46 Rhonda Copelon makes this argument in respect of survivors of domestic violence, though
she still argues that such violence should be recognized as torture: ‘Intimate Terror:
Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture’, in R Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National
and International Perspectives (Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 116.
47 Engle (n 45) 813. 48 McGlynn (n 42).
49 For a similar example, see the discussion around the term ‘genocidal rape’, discussed in
McGlynn (n 42) 79–80.
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and circumstances of the rape, the status of the perpetrator and the victim’s sex
and youth.
Examining ‘sex and youth’ ﬁrst, it is not exactly clear what implications are
to be gleaned from this part of the judgment. It seems from the way in which
the Court dealt ﬁrst with the rape, then with the other harmful acts, that the
reference to ‘sex and youth’ as aggravating factors refers to forms of ‘terri-
fying and humiliating’ experiences, other than the rape. It could be, therefore,
that the Court considers these criteria relevant to the non-sexual ill-treatment.
Nonetheless, when assessing the severity of treatment, the Court has said that
these criteria are relevant and it is, therefore, important to consider what the
Court might have meant, in the context of rape.
In relation to ‘youth’, this criterion is a factor emphasizing the vulnerability
of the individual, both emotionally and physically, and clearly in the Court’s
view aggravates conduct, bringing it closer to torture. This seems relatively
straightforward and ties in with the Court’s repeated references to the need
to ensure particular protection of ‘vulnerable’ individuals.50 However, it is not
immediately clear what the Court has in mind in relation to ‘sex’.51 Was the
Court making a broader statement that for the victim to endure rape, and/or the
other forms of torture inﬂicted on the victim in Aydin v Turkey, was worse
as she was female, than had she been male? It would certainly be wrong to
class female rape as ‘worse’ and therefore more harmful than male rape.52
Were it an argument from chivalry that to inﬂict pain and torture on a woman
is somehow worse than on a man, due to social assumptions about the role
of women, this too would be undesirable. It may be possible to interpret
the reference to the victim’s ‘sex’ as alluding to the psychological impact
of the rape on a virgin (as Aydin was) in a cultural context in which the loss of
virginity, prior to marriage, even through rape, could have serious adverse
consequences for a woman’s future marriage prospects.53 Nonetheless, it
would be far preferable were the Court’s references to ‘youth and sex’ to be
taken as referring only to the non-sexual forms of ill-treatment,54 indicating
that in relation to rape, the victim’s sex (or sexual status) is neither an
50 This ‘vulnerability’ is most evident in matters involving children and/or education. See for
example A v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 611, discussed in Clapham (n 6) 373–374.
51 The ICTR and ICTY have also included ‘sex’ within their list of variables when con-
sidering whether torture has occurred. See further C Burchard, ‘Torture in the Jurisprudence of the
Ad Hoc Tribunals’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 159, 165.
52 On the harm of male rape: G Mezey and M King, Male Victims of Sexual Assault (2nd edn,
OUP, Oxford, 2000) and P Rumney, ‘Policing Male Rape and Sexual Assault’ (2008) 72 Journal
of Criminal Law 67.
53 Similar issues arose in Prosecutor v Delalic where the ICTY Trial Chamber emphasised
that in considering whether rape gives rise to pain and suffering, one ‘must not only look at the
physical consequences, but also at the psychological and social consequences of rape’ (n 30) para
486.
54 However, even in such circumstances, it is not clear that a distinction on the grounds of
‘sex’ is justiﬁable.
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aggravating factor, nor one lowering culpability, although youth may well
aggravate the offence.
The other potentially aggravating factor, ‘rape of a detainee by an ofﬁcial of
the State’, is related to key criteria for a ﬁnding of torture itself, namely the
role of the State. But if we stay for now with considering this as an aggravating
factor, which enhances the harm of rape from ill-treatment to torture, there are
a number of issues to consider. The Court seemed to be suggesting that the
status of the perpetrator, here a ‘State ofﬁcial’, aggravates the offence. A
rationale for this is not expressed, but might be based on the fact that if the
perpetrator is an agent of the State, it may make them appear, in the eyes of the
victim, to be inviolable and thus a complaint is less likely and resistance may
appear futile. For example, the very act of reporting the conduct may make the
victim vulnerable again to persecution as the agent may well have knowledge
of the complaint.55 The Court recognized this in Aksoy v Turkey in which it
stated that the victim’s severe ill-treatment at the hands of State ofﬁcials
‘would have given him cause to feel vulnerable, powerless and apprehensive
of the representatives of the State’.56 The ICTY has made a similar argument
stating that the ‘condemnation and punishment of rape becomes all the more
urgent where it is committed by, or at the instigation of, a public ofﬁcial’.57
Arguably, this comes down to a question of trust, or rather abuse of trust, on
the basis that we are all entitled to place trust in state ofﬁcials, whether they
be the security forces, the police, prison ofﬁcers and the like. These are indi-
viduals who are supposed to act to protect citizens from harm and to act within
the rule of law.58 For such persons to breach this trust is an especially grave
act as it can destroy the ability of the victim to trust any person in authority in
the future, leaving that person feeling even more vulnerable and insecure. This
is recognized in other jurisdictions, for example constituting an aggravating
factor in sexual assaults.59 This justiﬁcation certainly seems plausible in re-
lation to a State ofﬁcial, but also has clear parallels for other types of rape
which must be made clear.
55 This argument is put forward in Colin Yeo, ‘Agents of the State: when is an ofﬁcial of the
state an agent of the state?’ (2002) 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 509, 523.
56 Aksoy (n 8) para 56. 57 Delalic (n 30) para 495.
58 In Costello-Roberts (n 15) Article 3 was not found to be violated where a step-father hit the
victim with a slipper a number of times. On the contrary, in Tryer, application no 5856/72,
judgment of 25 April 1978, the treatment of the victim who was ‘birched’ in the Isle of Man was
found to constitute degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. Among the factors distinguishing
the two cases, the Court in Tryer emphasized the ‘institutionalized character’ of the violence as
being signiﬁcant (para 33). This is akin to the argument being made here regarding the breach of
trust where a state ofﬁcial commits the violent acts.
59 In sentencing guidelines produced in England and Wales in relation to sexual assaults,
including rape, a number of aggravating factors are listed which will increase sentence and these
include the abuse of power and/or abuse of a position of trust: Sentencing Guidelines Council,
Sexual Offences Act 2003—Deﬁnitive Guideline (London, Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2007),
9–10, available at: http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/docs/0000_SexualOffencesAct1.pdf
[accessed 26 May 2008].
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To emphasize: it is abuse of trust or abuse of a position of power which
is the aggravated harm, with abuse by a State ofﬁcial just one form of that
violation. In this way, any rape which also involves an abuse of power or
position of trust, be it by a partner or former partner, employer, teacher, or
other private individual, will constitute an aggravating factor. Indeed, it is
arguable that the abuse of trust could be more so in the latter types of case: it
seems entirely possible that Sukran Aydin placed almost no faith or trust in the
security forces in Turkey. To underline the point, this aspect of the ruling in
Aydin v Turkey should be interpreted as meaning that it is the abuse of trust or
position of power that is the crucial aggravating factor, of which just one
example is abuse by a state ofﬁcial.60
Linked to the harm of rape by a State ofﬁcial, the Court appeared to place
emphasis on the place of the rape. The Court in Aydin v Turkey referred to
the rape of a ‘detainee’ being especially grave ‘given the ease with which
the offender can exploit the vulnerability and weakened resistance of his
victim.’61 This suggests that detention is a factor aggravating the treatment,
making it more severe, and more likely to ground a ﬁnding of torture.62 But it
is important to emphasize that while state detention clearly will induce vul-
nerability in a detainee, it is the vulnerability that should be signiﬁcant, not the
site of the treatment. Therefore, exactly where that conduct takes place should
not be over-emphasized. It should further be recognized that the vulnerability
of detention can be reproduced in many other circumstances, for example in
the home of a woman being raped and abused. Thus, it is a victim’s inability
to escape from the perpetrator, both psychologically and/or physically,63
and their consequent fear regarding what will happen, which is signiﬁcant.
Accordingly, it is essential that the term ‘detainee’ in Aydin is not interpreted
to mean a particular physical place, such as a state detention facility, but
60 On the contrary, Radacic argues that whether ‘an individual was raped by a state agent or
by a private individual should not be relevant in assessing the severity of treatment, as distinct
from establishing the responsibility of the state’ (n 4) 364.
61 Aydin v Turkey (n 1) para 83.
62 It is certainly clear since Ilhan v Turkey [2000] ECHR 354 that for treatment to amount to
torture it does not have to take place in state detention. In this case, the victim was beaten by
security forces in a ﬁeld near to his village, prior to being taken into detention. Thus, while the
treatment under examination did not exclusively take place in detention, it was an element of the
case and the fact of being taken into detention did conﬁrm state involvement and the vulnerability
of the victim. So, while the acts do not all need to take place within detention, to presage a ﬁnding
of torture, thus far it has been an element in all torture cases. It would certainly be an arbitrary
distinction were the place of the conduct in question to become a criterion for a ﬁnding of torture.
Note that there is no speciﬁcation regarding the place of the torture in the UN Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984,
S Treaty Doc No 100-20, 1465 UNTS 85, 114 (entered into force on 26 June 1987) Article 1.
63 The ICTY recognized in Kunarac, when considering the crime of enslavement, that even
when the women involved had the physical means to leave the house in which they were being
held, via keys or the house being left open, in practice this was not a reasonable possibility as they
had nowhere else to go and had no place to hide from their persecutors even had they left. They
therefore had ‘no realistic option whatsoever to ﬂee the house’ (n 38) para 742.
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should instead denote either a physical place, but not limited to a state facility
and including therefore the home, or even better a psychological condition
such that the individual considers that they have no means of escape.64
As Deborah Blatt has stated, a ‘woman’s home can become her torture
chamber’.65
One ﬁnal aspect relating to the severity threshold is that the Court has stated
that the acts in question must be ‘deliberate’.66 This suggests that the conduct
in question must not be accidental or unintentional.67 This criterion maps onto
the United Nations Convention Against Torture’s requirement that acts of
torture are ‘intentional’, which has been interpreted to mean that the acts are
‘consciously and actively occasioned’.68 This part of an inquiry into the nature
of the conduct should not give rise to any particular problems: an act of sexual
intercourse can scarcely be accidental or unintentional. Nonetheless, it is un-
fortunately conceivable that in the context of rape, it may be argued that the
acts in question were not deliberate, but impulsive, in the ‘heat of passion’ and
were the result of a loss of self-control and therefore not ‘deliberate’. An
enduring myth of rape, and of masculine sexuality, is that once unleashed,
male libido is an unstoppable force. Such an argument, were it ever to be run,
should be dismissed forthwith. All rapes are speciﬁc and deliberate acts over
which the perpetrator retains control and the possibility of resistance. Further,
there should be no requirement for pre-mediation or planning for acts to still
be ‘deliberate’ and ‘intended’.69
In essence, therefore, I am arguing that the Court in Aydin v Turkey estab-
lished that an act of rape could satisfy the threshold of harm for torture, but
implied that not all rapes will necessarily do so. Exactly which criteria will be
considered by the Court, and how they will be interpreted, is moot, but it
64 Rhonda Copelon has examined the criterion of state detention for a ﬁnding of torture in the
domestic violence context and explains the reality that victims of domestic abuse do indeed feel
imprisoned in their own homes and unable to leave. They are in effect in detention; detention at
the hands of their abusers. Women do theoretically have the opportunity to leave, but it is now
generally accepted that this does not conform to the reality of the victim’s experience: Copelon
(n 46) 138.
65 D Blatt, ‘Recognizing Rape as a Method of Torture’ (1991–1992) 19 New York University
Review of Law and Social Change 821, 851. Indeed, Blatt continues that in some circumstances
of rape, such as mass rape, the ‘intimidation of a populace is most effectively accomplished when
ofﬁcials rape women in their homes because family members often witness the attack and share
the feelings of degradation and powerlessness’ 851. 66 Aksoy (n 8) para 63.
67 For a discussion of this requirement in international criminal law, see Burchard (n 51).
68 As discussed in E Smith, ‘A Legal Analysis of Rape as Torture: Article 3 ECHR and the
Treatment of Rape within the European System’ in Michael Peel (ed) Rape as a Method of
Torture (Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, Report No 1000340, 2004) 202.
69 Malcolm Evans discusses the practice of the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Punishment, which reports on the operation of
Article 3, to reserve the term ‘torture’ to describe activities inﬂicted for a particular purpose and
which have usually required some form of ‘preparation’, largely in terms of equipment for the
conduct of torture. Were such an approach to be adopted, in general, to torture it would be
regrettable as it would preclude acts of sexual violence which generally do not require, though
often involve, forms of equipment. See Evans (n 18) 374.
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seems from the above analysis that issues such as the status of the perpetrator,
the age and sex of the victim, and the place of the rape may be relevant. I have
sought to argue that within the conﬁnes of this approach, the Court should be
encouraged to be as ﬂexible as possible in its interpretations, to expand the
boundaries of Article 3 to ensure that it recognizes the varied ways in which
torture is carried out and in which the harms of rape and sexual violence are
perpetrated. In other words, the Court must strive to move beyond a stereo-
typical view of torture, towards an acceptance of its multifaceted nature.
Further, it is clear that the Court has not taken the same approach to ‘rape as
torture’ as that of the ICTY, which found that the act of rape per se constitutes
the harm of torture. Such an approach does indeed have the beneﬁt of sim-
plicity and avoids problems of some rapes not being taken as seriously as
others. Rhonda Copelon argues that a reason why rape, and other crimes of
sexual violence, should be mainstreamed into international law, such that rape
constitutes torture, is that ‘history teaches us that there is an almost inevitable
tendency for crimes that are seen simply or primarily as crimes against women
to be treated as of secondary importance’.70 This is true. But there is also the
danger that if all rapes are subsumed under the term ‘torture’, such harms
would be more easily forgotten and less easily recognized as gender-based,
with the attention continuing to be on ‘real’ torture.71 It may also be that in
characterizing rape as torture, we fail to accept the diversity of experience of
rape survivors who may not characterize their harms as ‘severe’ harms, suf-
ﬁcient to ground a torture claim. Kelly Askin has suggested that if we ‘reverse
the stigmas and stereotypes association with sex crimes’, removing the ‘shame
and stigma’ from victims, ‘we take away much of the power held by the per-
petrators of these crimes’.72 Holding that not all rapes are of extreme severity
may go some way towards reducing the stigma and stereotyping associated
with the crime.
To conclude: my argument is that all rapes should be held to satisfy the
minimum threshold for Article 3, on the basis that all European societies not
only criminalise rape, but also treat it as a crime of particular gravity.
Accordingly, it is appropriate and necessary to hold that all rapes constitute
inhuman and/or degrading treatment. Such a ﬁnding is also vital to ensuring
that states take greater responsibility, via their positive obligations, to prevent
rape and convict rapists. However, it does not necessarily follow that all rapes
per se entail the severe harm necessary for a ﬁnding of torture. The severity of
the harm is necessarily subjective, varying to an extent from case to case.
While this can have disadvantages, with some victims’ harms not being taken
70 R Copelon, ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into
International Criminal Law’ (2000–2001) 46 McGill Law Journal 217, 234.
71 See further McGlynn (n 42).
72 K Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under Inter-
national Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’ (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of
International Law 288, 347.
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seriously, whereas a common ‘standard’ might obviate such intrusions into the
victim’s experiences, it also has advantages. It can take into account a victim’s
perspective and ensure that they are included in the process of assessing and
determining what happened to them. Further, it has a more strategic point.
This line of reasoning would mean retaining the label ‘torture’ for some acts
which different societies hold as especially egregious, for example rape by
state ofﬁcials, as well as maintaining the label ‘rape’, with its own powerful
associations and gendered meaning.
Further, I have argued that in considering the different elements which
might aggravate rape, bringing it within the realms of torture, the elements
highlighted by the Court in Aydin v Turkey should be broadly interpreted so as
not to privilege speciﬁc forms of rape, by speciﬁc perpetrators, in speciﬁc
physical contexts. Thus, the immediate imperative is to ensure that in deter-
mining severity, the Court does not rely on common myths and assumptions
about rape. The Court should abide by its ruling in Selmouni which speciﬁ-
cally endorsed a ﬂexible approach to torture by stating that ‘[c]ertain acts
which were classiﬁed in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as
opposed to “torture” could be classiﬁed differently in the future’.73 The Court
so held on the basis that the ‘increasingly high standard being required in the
area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspond-
ingly and inevitably requires greater ﬁrmness in assessing breaches of funda-
mental values in democratic societies’.74
IV. THE ‘PURPOSE’ OF RAPE
While the Court has emphasized the signiﬁcance of the severity of treatment
for it to constitute torture, from the late 1960s and the Greek case, the Court
has also highlighted another important aspect to torture, namely its purpose.75
In the Greek case, the Court held that ‘the word “torture” is often used to
describe inhuman treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of
information or confessions, or the inﬂiction of punishment, and it is generally
an aggravated form of inhuman treatment’.76 While this reference to purpose
did not initially take on much signiﬁcance, in recent years it has become clear
that it now constitutes an important element to any torture inquiry.77
In ﬁnding there to have been torture in both Aksoy v Turkey and Aydin v
Turkey, the Court made reference to the political context of the victims’ de-
tention and to the political purposes for which they were held, namely the
extraction of information and intimidation generally.78 In the subsequent
73 Selmouni v France (2000) 29 EHRR 403, para 101. 74 ibid.
75 The Greek case, [1969] 12 YB 1. 76 ibid 186.
77 Indeed Evans argues that the Commission and Court ‘have never fully subscribed to the
severity of suffering approach, despite their mantra-like espousal of it over the years’: (n 18) 373.
78 In Aydin v Turkey the Court stated that the conduct in question was ‘for a purpose, which
can only be explained on account of the security situation in the region . . . and the need of the
580 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Mar 2011 IP address: 129.234.252.66
cases of Ilhan v Turkey and Salman v Turkey, the Court made this ‘purposive
element’ an explicit criterion for a ﬁnding of torture.79 In doing so, the Court
referred to the purposive condition in the UN Convention on Torture.80 The
UN Convention provides that for the relevant conduct to constitute torture it
must be carried out for one of the prohibited purposes which are listed as: ‘for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a con-
fession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind’.81 While the
severity threshold focussed on the victim, the purposive element transfers
scrutiny to the perpetrator and the circumstances surrounding the conduct or
treatment in question.
The rape in Aydin v Turkey, therefore, clearly came within a traditional
purposive approach to torture, being ostensibly for political purposes regard-
ing intimidation, coercion and the extraction of information or a confession.82
Indeed, in cases such as Aydin v Turkey and Aksoy v Turkey, the Court did not
undertake an evidential enquiry into whether or not the purpose has been met,
making this assumption as the conduct took place in state custody. But such an
assumption will not always be made, as was clear in Denizci and others v
Cyprus and Egmez v Cyprus where a link between the ill-treatment and
‘extracting a confession’ had not been established.83 While in both cases the
allegation of torture was rejected on the lack of evidence of severity of harm,
there was also a clear implication that the lack of purpose regarding confes-
sions was relevant.
It is evident, therefore, that the Court’s jurisprudence demands that the
ill-treatment in question is carried out for a prohibited purpose and that, thus
security forces to elicit information’: (n 1) para 85. These points were made without hearing
evidence on this particular point. In other words, it was just assumed that this was the reason for
the conduct and that this satisﬁed any insipient ‘purposive’ criterion. This is also the case in the
more recent case of Dikme v Turkey (n 26).
79 Ilhan v Turkey (n 62) para 85; Salman v Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 17, para 114. See also
Akkoc v Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 51; Mahmut Kaya v Turkey [2000] ECHR 129, para 117.
80 Ilhan v Turkey ibid; Salman v Turkey ibid. UN Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (n 60), Article 1: ‘For the purposes of this
Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inﬂicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inﬂicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public ofﬁcial or other person acting in an
ofﬁcial capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions.’ 81 ibid.
82 Zilli has criticized the reference to the purpose for which Aydin was raped as this ignores
the fact that not only was her rape an action of discrimination on the grounds of her ethnicity,
being Kurdish, but also of gender discrimination—she was raped because she was a woman:
(n 20) 261–262.
83 Egmez v Cyprus (2002) 34 EHRR 29, para 78 and Denizci and others v Cyprus [2001]
ECHR 351, para 384.
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far, the discussion of purpose has been solely linked to the extraction of
confessions and information. The question following on from this is whether
the purposive element will and should continue to be limited to such a narrow
range of circumstances. The UN Convention deﬁnition of torture goes beyond
this narrow conception, speciﬁcally referring to one of the proscribed purposes
as being ‘for any reason based on discrimination of any kind’. The Court has
increasingly been looking to the UN Convention for guidance in developing
its jurisprudence and I would argue that it certainly should do so in this area. If
the Court were to consider this broader category of purposeful action in the
UN Convention, the next area for debate is whether the act of rape itself
constitutes ‘discrimination of any kind’? If so, this would mean that the pur-
posive element of torture is met in every case of rape. There has yet to be any
ruling on this in relation to UN Convention,84 but there has been discussion of
this criterion before the ICTY.
When defending himself against the charge of rape as torture, Zoran
Vukovic claimed that even if he had raped the victim, which he denied,
he argued that he had committed the act out of a ‘sexual urge, not out of
hatred’.85 In so arguing, he was trying to tap into a vein of thought which
conceives of rape as a desperate act of sexual fulﬁlment, rather than one of
violence and power. Most immediately for him, he was claiming that he did
not rape for one of the prohibited purposes required for a ﬁnding of torture.
The ICTY Trial Chamber rejected this argument, in part, on the basis that the
prohibited purpose need only be part of the motivation and does not need to be
the predominant or sole purpose.86 In holding that part of the motivation may
be a ‘sexual urge’, this ruling suggests that the sexual urge is distinguishable
from any other purposes of rape. It is important for future rulings that it is
recognized that while there may be a sexual urge in rape, there is always
another element, namely the use of power. Every act of rape is an act of power
and therefore with purposes beyond sexual gratiﬁcation.
Further dicta from the ICTY conﬁrm this approach. In Prosecutor v Delalic
the ICTY Trial Chamber held that ‘the violence suffered . . . in the form of
rape, was inﬂicted upon her by Delalic because she is a woman . . . this re-
presents a form of discrimination which constitutes a prohibited purpose for
the offence of torture’.87 Kelly Askin argues that this ‘acknowledges that
females are often tortured in ways different than males, and singled out for
discriminatory treatment because of their sex or gender’.88 The import of this
ruling is that all rapes of women will constitute a prohibited purpose as all
women are raped because they are women.89 Similarly, in Kvocka the Trial
84 Edwards (n 5) 375–376. 85 Kunarac (n 38), para 816.
86 ibid. 87 Delalic (n 30) para 941. 88 Askin (n 72) 324.
89 There is some debate as to whether or not this is the deﬁnitive conclusion from this case. In
the subsequent Kunarac case the Trial Chamber held that rape and torture could be cumulatively
charged. Rosalind Dixon has suggested this means, implicitly, that ‘rape does not inherently
embody gender discrimination as a constituent mental element’: R Dixon ‘Rape as a Crime
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Chamber found that ‘the rape and other forms of sexual violence were com-
mitted only against non-Serb detainees in the camp and that they were com-
mitted solely against women, making the crimes discriminatory on multiple
levels’.90
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the ICTY is dealing with inter-
national humanitarian law and discussions of the ‘purposive’ element of the
deﬁnition of torture are not, therefore, tethered to state policies or interests.
Thus, it has been argued that the purposive element of torture and the text
‘discrimination of any kind’ needs to be interpreted in the same context as
other examples of purposes, namely confessions, the extraction of information
and such like.91 However, it is not clear that this has been deﬁnitively deter-
mined, with others emphasising that the deﬁnition of torture contained in
Article 1 of the UN Convention does not list the purposes as exhaustive,
speciﬁcally referring to ‘such purposes as . . .’92
If we assume that rape is not a crime of ‘passion-gone-wrong’,93 and that
‘any other purpose’ may be interpreted more broadly as including gendered
violence, then what is it that is the purpose of rape? Catharine MacKinnon
argues that all rapes are for a purpose—the maintenance of male dominance.94
The abuse she says is ‘neither random nor individual’; it is ‘systemic and
group-based’ and is ‘deﬁned by the distribution of power in society’.95 Rape is
not an opportunistic, inexplicable crime committed by one aberrant individual
against another. It exists because of, and perpetuates, women’s inequality to
men. Charlotte Bunch argues that violence against women is political and the
‘message is domination: stay in your place or be afraid’.96 This argument is
echoed by Kelly Askin who contends that if ‘gender were not a factor, grossly
disproportionate instances of sexual violence would not be committed against
in International Humanitarian Law: where to from here?’ (2002) 13 European Journal of
International Law 697, 700, citing paras 443–460 of Kunarac (n 38). However, it could equally be
the case that not every rape is torture as the other conditions for a ﬁnding of torture are not met. In
this light, once the other prerequisites have been satisﬁed, the purposive burden has also been met.
90 Prosecutor v Kvocka, ICTY-98-30-T (2 November 2001) para 560.
91 See the discussion in Edwards (n 5) 375–376 and Smith (n 68) 206.
92 H Burgers and H Danelius, The United National Convention Against Torture—A Handbook
on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 118, discussed in Copelon ‘Recognising the
Egregrious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture’ (1994) 25 Columbia Human Rights
Law Review 291, 329.
93 C Niarchos, ‘Women, War and Rape: challenges facing the ICTY’ (1995) 17 Human
Rights Quarterly 649, 650.
94 MacKinnon rightly asserts that sexual assault is ‘best understood as social—attitudinal and
ideological, role-bound and identity-deﬁned—not natural’. In other words, there is no biological
reason or justiﬁcation, as such an explanation would not explain female sexual aggressors and
male victims, or why many men do not sexually assault others (n 41) 240–241. That rape and
sexual assault is gender based is also internationally accepted in various instruments including the
UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women and the
Council of Europe: MacKinnon (n 41) 241. 95 ibid (n 41) 22.
96 C Bunch, ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Re-vision of Human Rights’
(1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 486, 491.
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women’.97 Thus, sexual violence is gendered in that it is committed, primar-
ily, by men against women and therefore constitutes discrimination. Rhonda
Copelon argues that rape is ‘sexualized violence that seeks to destroy a
woman based on her identity as a woman’.98 She continues that while men are
raped, the ‘humiliation in male rape is accomplished by reducing him to the
status of a woman’. For this reason, she suggests, ‘rape, whether carried out
against women or men, is a crime of gender’.99 In this way, all acts of sexual
violence, including male rape, are gendered and discriminatory and are com-
mitted for reasons beyond sexual satisfaction.
This recognition of rape as a crime of gender with discriminatory intent
has found support internationally. In relation to the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Women’s
Committee issued a General Recommendation which stated that the ‘deﬁ-
nition of discrimination included gender-based violence, that is, violence
directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women
disproportionately’.100 This clearly applies to rape, which predominantly af-
fects women, and supports the argument that rape is a discriminatory act.
Further support can be gained from the UN General Assembly which adopted
a Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in 1993 which
made it clear that violence against women is a ‘manifestation of historically
unequal power relationships between men and women’.101 This proposition
also has been jurisprudentially recognised, with the Canadian Supreme
Court stating in R v Oslin that ‘[s]exual assault is in the vast majority of cases
gender based. It . . . constitutes a denial of any concept of equality for
women’.102
There is evidence that the European Court of Human Rights understands
rape and other forms of sexual violence as being part of an overall picture of
discrimination against women. In MC v Bulgaria, when surveying the range
and purpose of sexual assault laws internationally, the Court referred speciﬁ-
cally to the Council of Europe’s recommendation on the need to take measures
to combat violence against women.103 The Council of Europe’s recommen-
dation afﬁrmed that ‘violence towards women is the result of an imbalance
of power between men and women and is leading to serious discrimination
97 K Askin, ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Tribunals: Current Status’ (1999) 93 AJIL 97, 103.
98 R Copelon, ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian
Law’ (1994) 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 243, 246. 99 Copelon ibid.
100 CEDAW GR No 19: Violence Against Women, UN Doc A/47/38 (1992), para 6, discussed
in Edwards (n 5) 377. See also Copelon (n 46) 134.
101 Discussed in Hilary Charlesworth and C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000) 235.
102 R v Oslin [1993] 4 SCR 595, 669.
103 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the Protection
of Women Against Violence (2002), para 35, referred to in MC v Bulgaria (n 4) paras 101 and
162, emphasis added.
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against the female sex, both within society and within the family’.104 More-
over, the Court continued that there have been developments towards adopting
laws and practices to prevent violence against women which form part of an
‘evolution of societies towards effective equality and respect for each indi-
vidual’s sexual autonomy’.105 The reference here to equality underlines the
recognition that sexual assault laws are about women and discrimination and
equality, as much as about preventing physical violence. In other words, it is
essential to recognize that rape does not happen because of unfulﬁlled sexual
desire, nor does it take place in a social and political vacuum. Gendered
violence, including rape, takes place because women remain unequal in society
and because it perpetuates such continuing inequalities. It has a purpose and
that purpose is gendered discrimination, which should be interpreted as con-
stituting a prohibited purpose for the purpose, so to speak, of constituting
torture.
The focus here, thus far, has been on bringing rape within the ‘discrimi-
nation of any kind’ purpose. However, not only does and should rape satisfy
this discriminatory purpose required for torture, but it could also come within
other prohibited purposes, namely intimidation, coercion or even punishment.
As the ICTR stated in Akayesu, like torture, rape is in fact ‘used for such
purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punish-
ment, control or destruction of a person’.106 Indeed, other jurisdictions take a
more expansive approach to the ‘purpose’ of torture, with the Inter-American
Torture Convention including as prohibited purposes ‘personal punishment’
and a general criterion of ‘or for any other purpose’.107 The ICTY has ex-
panded the scope of the prohibited purposes in the deﬁnition of torture to
include ‘humiliation’ holding that this was warranted ‘by the general spirit of
international humanitarian law: the primary purpose of this body of law is to
safeguard human dignity’.108 In the particular case, the ICTY held that the
victim was raped in order to ‘degrade and humiliate’ her.109 Such approaches
broaden the deﬁnition of torture quite signiﬁcantly: a purpose of ‘humiliation’
could be found in a large number of rapes, perhaps even all rapes.
While feminist scholars have criticized the purposive criterion for torture,
on the basis that it is ‘reinforcing the “male” context of torture as it implies
that torture only takes place within the context of arrest, interrogation and
detention’,110 it seems clear that it is an essential element of a torture enquiry
in Convention jurisprudence. Accordingly, my argument is that all rapes are
104 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec (2002) to member
states on the protection of violence against women, 30 April 2002.
105 MC v Bulgaria (n 4) para 165, emphasis added.
106 Akayesu (n 2) para 597. 107 Discussed in Edwards (n 5) 382–384.
108 Prosecutor v Furundzija (Judgment) ICTY-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para 162.
109 ibid paras 124, 130. Subsequent case law has doubted whether ‘humiliation’ is a prohibited
purpose: see Krnojelac (ICTY-97-25), Trial Chamber, 15 March 2002, para 186 and Simic et al
(ICTY-95-9), Trial Chamber, 17 October 2003, para 79, both discussed in Burchard (n 51)
168–170. 110 As discussed in Edwards (n 5) 375.
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for a purpose, whether it be discrimination, intimidation, coercion or other
prohibited reason, such that they automatically satisfy this criterion for tor-
ture. There is no evidence yet that the Court will adopt such an interpretation
of ‘purpose’. However, in increasingly looking to the UN Convention for
guidance, I suggest that the Court should endorse a broad interpretation of
purpose, beyond just extraction of confessions and information, thereby taking
cognizance of the fact that the problem of torture comes not just from physical
harm but also from the loss of dignity and respect.111 Furthermore, while
the emphasis on purpose, as an element of torture, shifts the focus onto the
perpetrator, as compared with the severity threshold which concentrates on
the victim, we must ensure that we are not blinded into concentrating on
supposedly individualised reasons for rape, such as sexual gratiﬁcation, and
remember the societal and political context of the reality of rape.
In sum, the claim that all rapes are for a prohibited purpose does not mean
that all rapes will constitute torture. Not only must the threshold of severity be
met, but the rape in Aydin v Turkey, it will be remembered, was perpetrated by
a State ofﬁcial. Torture, under the Convention legal system, is about State
responsibility for serious violence and abuse. A crucial deﬁnitional question
then becomes what or who constitutes the State? And in what circumstances,
therefore, is the State responsible for rape?
V. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAPE AS TORTURE
Aydin v Turkey was a clear example of rape by the State. Sukran Aydin was
raped in detention by a State ofﬁcial for the purposes of intimidation and
extraction of information. While this paradigmatic situation falls squarely
within the torture protection of Article 3, the more interesting and challenging
questions surround the boundaries of the concept of the State and therefore the
reach of State responsibility for rape as torture.
Traditionally, the system of international human rights protection has been
premised on ensuring state responsibility for breaches of those norms deemed
sufﬁciently fundamental to qualify as ‘human rights’. International protection
has been necessary in order to hold individual States to account where the
State itself is responsible for violating those fundamental rights, as in Aydin v
Turkey. The international system of human rights protection, therefore, has
been premised on securing State compliance with established norms and in-
vestigating possible State violations. The traditional rationale for this ‘State
actor’ requirement is that ‘private acts (of brutality) would usually be ordinary
criminal offences which national law enforcement is expected to press.
International concern with torture arises only when the State itself abandons
111 On the status of the UN Convention approach to torture, the ICTY has opined that there is
‘now a general acceptance of the main elements contained in the deﬁnition set out in article 1’ of
the UN Convention: Furundzija (n 108) para 153.
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its function of protecting its citizenry by sanctioning criminal action by law
enforcement personnel’.112 Accordingly, the Convention system is about State
responsibility for violations of the Convention. Similarly, and in the speciﬁc
area of torture, the UN Convention restricts the scope of its deﬁnition of
torture to conduct ‘inﬂicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public ofﬁcial or other person acting in an ofﬁcial
capacity’.113 A connection with the State must be established for there to be
responsibility and jurisdiction under these legal regimes.
This may all appear obvious and was certainly settled jurisprudence until
two particular changes and developments over the last decade or more. The
ﬁrst is the growing recognition that a state-centred approach to international
law in general, and international human rights law in particular, is no longer
appropriate. As Philip Alston has put it, ‘the world is a much more poly-
centric place than it was’ and viewing the world through the prism of the state
is a ‘rather distorted image’ for the 21st century.114 Power is more diffuse and
non-state actors are more and more responsible for activities hitherto conﬁned
to state control. This has an impact on the concept of state responsibility and
the scope of the ‘State actor’ requirement in human rights law. The second
development is the growing recognition that for human rights norms to make a
real impact on the variety of ways in which peoples’ rights are infringed, states
need to be more proactive in ensuring protection of rights. Such an advance
has meant that human rights obligations on States now extend far beyond
the traditional conﬁnes of negative rights, towards positive requirements or
obligations to take action to secure and protect rights.
Returning to the torture context, these developments have complicated the
picture and have challenged the assumption that torture is only realized where
acts are carried out directly by the state. A key area of critique of the state
actor requirement is in relation to sexual violence and, in particular, its use
in evading state responsibility for the prevalence of sexual violence. Indeed,
as Alice Edwards remarks, the UN Convention torture deﬁnition, with its
requirement for State participation, has been ‘the object of near unanimous
disapproval by feminist writers’.115 For example, Hilary Charlesworth,
Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright argue that the ‘severe pain and suffering
that is inﬂicted outside the most public context of the State—for example,
within the home or by private persons, which is the most pervasive and
112 N Rodley, ‘The Evolution of the International Prohibition of Torture’ in Amnesty
International, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948–1988: Human Rights, the UN
and Amnesty International, 63, discussed in H Charlesworth, C Chinkin and S Wright ‘Feminist
Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85 AJIL 613, 628.
113 Article 1 (n 62).
114 P Alston, ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime
Accommodate Non-State Actors?’ in P Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP,
Oxford, 2005) 3, 4. See also R McCorquodale, ‘An Inclusive International Legal System’ (2004)
17 Leiden J of Intl L 477. 115 Edwards (n 5) 368.
Rape, Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights 587
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Mar 2011 IP address: 129.234.252.66
signiﬁcant violence sustained by women—does not qualify as torture despite
its impact on the inherent dignity of the human person’.116 They are therefore
critical of the distinction drawn between acts by state ofﬁcials, which may
constitute torture, and acts by private persons, which will not. Such a dis-
tinction clearly has signiﬁcant implications for the offence of rape, as it is
most often perpetrated by private individuals against other private individuals.
However, in light of the developments and changes in human rights norms
in recent years, it may be that the boundaries between State and non-State
action are not as clear as they once were and therefore that there is increased
scope for a broader concept of state responsibility. Indeed, Malcolm Evans
refers to a ‘dramatic broadening’ of what falls within the scope of acts of state
ofﬁcials under Convention jurisprudence.117 However, before addressing what
constitutes State acts, the ﬁrst question is to clarify whether, for acts to come
within torture under Article 3, they must indeed be carried out by State ofﬁ-
cials.
As noted above, the UN Convention restricts the scope of acts of torture to
conduct ‘inﬂicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiesc-
ence of a public ofﬁcial or other person acting in an ofﬁcial capacity’. Thus,
while the UN Convention is explicit in its deﬁnition of when State liability for
torture will ensue, the European Convention is absent on such issues and the
Court has been reluctant to draw clear boundaries. Nonetheless, in every case
in which there has been a positive ﬁnding of torture, the conduct in question
has been meted out by a state ofﬁcial.118 But does this mean that for there
to be torture there must have been acts of State ofﬁcials? In Kaya v Turkey the
Court considered whether Hasan Kaya had been tortured before being killed.
The Court noted that it had not found that any State agent was directly res-
ponsible for Kaya’s death,119 but continued nonetheless to consider whether
116 Charlesworth et al (n 112) 629. 117 Evans (n 18) 378.
118 In relation to acts by State actors, the Court does appear willing to draw the net wider than
just state sanctioned acts. In Cyprus v Turkey (1982) 4 EHRR 482 while there was no ﬁnding of
torture for the rape of Cypriot women by Turkish soldiers, there was inhuman treatment carried
out by ‘State actors’ which was beyond their ofﬁcial authority. This responsibility for ultra vires
acts has been accepted by the Human Rights Committee responsible for the implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Human Rights Committee has found
that State responsibility extends to ultra vires acts of State ofﬁcials, HRC GC no 7, para 2, by
stating that state responsibility extends to acts ‘whether inﬂicted by people acting in their ofﬁcial
capacity, outside their ofﬁcial capacity or in a private capacity’: HRC GC no 20, paras 2 and 13,
discussed in Edwards (n 5) 365. This is a logical extension in the scope of acts attributed to States
in that a victim may not know whether the person is acting under State authority, or ultra vires,
and due to that lack of knowledge, the perception of the nature of the ill-treatment does not
change. In other words, the aggravation of the harm of rape by a state ofﬁcial, as discussed above,
is present whether or not the person is acting within their authority or not. Equally, control
exercised by the state over its ofﬁcials may well be greater if liability extends to ultra vires acts.
Therefore, it is argued that the European Court should develop its jurisprudence, if/when con-
fronted with this issue, to extend liability for ultra vires acts to encompass tortuous treatment,
following the international example of the Human Rights Committee.
119 Kaya v Turkey [2000] ECHR 129, para 114.
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his treatment constituted torture. In setting out the relevant criteria, the Court
referred to its previous jurisprudence on the ‘special stigma’ of torture, the
requirement of very serious and cruel suffering and to the need to demonstrate
a ‘purposive element’ to the conduct.120 The fact that the Court explicitly
stated that a State agent was not responsible for the acts in question, but
continued to consider whether the treatment amounted to torture, is a clear
implication that for a ﬁnding of torture, there does not have to be direct acts by
a State agent. In the case itself, the Court held that it was the medical evidence
which did not disclose a level of suffering of sufﬁcient severity to amount to
torture.121
While Kaya v Turkey cannot be taken as dispositive of this issue, clear
implications can be drawn regarding the Court’s approach. When considered
together with other jurisprudence of the Court, it seems that this is another
example of the Court retaining ﬂexibility over the scope of Article 3, and the
torture protection therein, in order to meet new demands and situations. The
Court has often stated that the Convention must be interpreted as a ‘living
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’
and speciﬁcally in relation to torture it held in Selmouni that ‘certain acts
which were classiﬁed in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as
opposed to “torture” could be classiﬁed differently today’.122 While Selmouni
was about thresholds for torture, it demonstrates the ﬂexibility being dis-
cussed. More speciﬁcally, in D v UK, concerning deportation to face ill-
treatment, the Court held that there could be a violation of Article 3 even
where the risk of harm to the individual concerned did not ‘engage either
directly or indirectly the responsibility of the public authorities’ in the relevant
State.123 It continued that the Court ‘must reserve to itself sufﬁcient ﬂexibility
to address the application of that Article [Article 3] in other contexts which
might arise’.124
Considering this line of case law, and its implications for the current dis-
cussion of rape and torture, it seems possible that a ﬁnding of torture may be
possible even where the treatment at issue is not directly perpetrated by a State
ofﬁcial. This does represent a signiﬁcant departure (and advance) from tra-
ditional understandings of state responsibility for torture. Further, it would go
some way towards meeting some feminist criticism of the state actor re-
quirement in view of the fact that the vast majority of rapes are not perpetrated
by State ofﬁcials, but by private individuals and all such rapes could possibly
constitute torture, so long as they met the threshold of severity of harm (the
purposive element being met in all rape cases).
120 ibid para 117. 121 ibid para 118.
122 Selmouni v France (n 73) para 101.
123 D v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423, para 49.
124 ibid para 49, discussed in R McCorquodale and R La Forgia ‘Taking off the Blindfolds:
Torture by Non-State Actors’ (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 189, 210–211.
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Nonetheless, jurisdiction of the Convention is based on State responsibility
and so there remains the requirement for a nexus to the state. This State
responsibility can take a number of different forms, discussed below in three
broad categories. First, there has been considerable debate and case law de-
velopment in recent years surrounding the circumstances in which the acts of
non-state actors can be attributed to the state. In the case of rape as torture,
these debates have most resonance in states where there has been a breakdown
in State power such that, for example, rebel groups are in de facto control of
parts of territory. Thus in Elmi v Australia the Committee Against Torture
(CAT), the supervisory body that interprets and applies the UN Convention on
Torture, determined that actions by non-State actors could, in certain cir-
cumstances where they were acting with de facto State authority, be deemed
sufﬁciently ‘State-like’ to bring those actions within the state responsibility
requirement of the UN Convention.125 Nonetheless, the Committee has in-
terpreted this ‘State-like’ quality in a very limited way, restricting the scope of
non-state actors and the concept of acquiescence to ‘quasi-governmental
structures which exercise effective control over a territory or where there is no
central government’.126 This is a very high threshold and, as Edwards points
out, precludes the application of the UN Convention to many harms facing
women.127 Further, in the European context regarding rape, this approach to
expanding the reach of State responsibility to non-state actors exercising
de facto state control is of limited relevance as few rapes in such circum-
stances occur within Europe.128
The second and more common type of situation is where it is alleged that
private individuals acted with state acquiescence or consent. As noted above,
under the UN Convention state liability includes acts inﬂicted by, or at the
instigation of ‘or with the consent or acquiescence of a public ofﬁcial or other
person acting in an ofﬁcial capacity’. Much debate has surrounded the scope
of this consent or acquiescence standard. A signiﬁcant case in this respect is
Dzemajl v Yugoslavia, under the UN Convention, in which it was held that the
state had acquiesced to the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of the Roma
complainants which was witnessed by the police and in respect of which there
was a wholly inadequate investigation. The CAT decided that the relevant
state authorities had ‘acquiesced’ in the ill-treatment on the basis that although
the police ‘had been informed of the immediate risk that the complainants
were facing and had been present at the scene of events’, they ‘did not take
any appropriate steps to protect the complainants’.129 The CAT went on to
afﬁrm that although ‘the acts referred to by the complainants were not com-
mitted by public ofﬁcials themselves, the Committee considers that they were
125 (120/1998), 7 IHRR (2000). Discussed in McCorquodale and La Forgia, ibid 193–198.
126 Edwards (n 5) 374. 127 Edwards (n 5) 388.
128 With the obvious exception of the Balkan conﬂict.
129 Dzemajl v Yugoslavia, Communication No 161/2000, UN Doc CAT/C/29/D/161/2000
(11 November 1999) para 9.2.
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committed with their acquiescence and constitute therefore a violation’ of
Article 16 prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by the state
party.130
Dzemajl is an example of a case where the state was held responsible for
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as a result of its consent or acquiesc-
ence. While this was a case of ill-treatment, rather than torture, there does
not appear to be any valid reason why these principles should not equally
apply to the torture prohibition.131 Further, Edwards suggests that if the
reasoning in this case were followed, ‘it could prove pivotal to holding the
state responsible in speciﬁc domestic or family violence or other non-state-
actor cases’.132 Similar cases can be found in Convention jurisprudence,
though the language of consent or acquiescence is not used, but that of
‘positive obligations’ and some of the facts are less stark than in Dzemajl
where the police were actually present and witnessing the violence. For ex-
ample, in Z v the UK, the Court found a violation of Article 3 where a local
authority had failed to take steps to protect children known to be at risk of ill-
treatment by their parents.133 The Court noted that states are required ‘to take
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including ill-treatment
administered by private individuals’.134 The Court continued that such
measures should provide effective protection and ‘include reasonable steps
to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had
knowledge’.135 Malcolm Evans emphasizes that this ruling seems ‘to be the
most far reaching pronouncement yet on the scope of State responsibility
under Article 3’.136
This ruling is similar to Kaya v Turkey where the Court held that the State
‘authorities knew or ought to have known’ that Hasan Kaya was at risk of
being targeted by ‘certain elements of the security forces or those acting on
their behalf’.137 It continued that the failure to ‘protect his life through speciﬁc
measures and through the general failings in the criminal law framework
placed him in danger not only of extra-judicial execution but also of ill-
treatment from persons who were unaccountable for their actions’.138 It con-
cluded that ‘the State is responsible for the ill-treatment suffered by Hasan
Kaya after his disappearance and prior to his death’.139
130 ibid para 9.2.
131 Note that there was an Individual Opinion submitted by two members in dissent at the
Committee’s decision which argued that the conduct in question did amount to torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the UN Convention, discussed in Edwards (n 5) 373.
132 Edwards (n 5) 373.
133 Z v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3. See also Al Adsani v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 11, para 38: ‘It is true
that taken together, Articles 1 and 2 place a number of positive obligations on the High
Contracting Parties, designed to prevent and provide redress for torture and other forms of ill-
treatment.’ See also A v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 611, para 22.
134 Z v UK, ibid. 135 ibid para 73. 136 Evans (n 18) 379.
137 Kaya (n 119) para 74. 138 ibid para 116. 139 ibid.
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While in both Z v the UK and Kaya v Turkey the State was held responsible
for the ill-treatment, not torture, of the individuals involved, there is nothing to
suggest that a similar ﬁnding could not be made in respect of torture. In Z v the
UK the Court includes reference to torture when outlining its approach and in
Kaya v Turkey it considered the possibility of torture, but rejected that claim
only on the basis of the medical evidence, not principle. The Court classiﬁes
these cases as ones involving ‘state responsibility’ where the ‘authorities fail
to take reasonable steps to avoid a risk of ill-treatment about which they know
or ought to have known’.140 This type of situation is distinguished from State
responsibility ‘where the framework of law fails to provide adequate protec-
tion’,141 but which is still characterized as part of the positive obligations of
the State.
Arguably, the State responsibility in both of these cases, and similar ones,
may be better characterised as responsibility due to the consent or acquiesc-
ence of the state to known harms, or those in which it was deemed that they
ought to have had knowledge. In this way, as Nigel Rodley argues ‘govern-
ment ofﬁcials at all levels may be held responsible if they failed to stop torture
where it occurs. Failure so to act could well be interpreted at least as acquie-
sence’.142 So, acquiescence encompasses both situations where the state has
effectively lost control of part of a territory and where it takes no action in
relation to the known activities of non-State actors and private persons.143
This analysis differentiates between two situations which have generally
both been classed as involving the State’s positive obligations: ﬁrst, where the
State is aware of the harm or possible harm, but fails to take action (as in Z
v the UK) and, secondly, where there is a more generic failing on the part of
the state, in terms of its legislative or administrative structures or processes.
The former situation, it has been suggested above, should be characterised as
engaging the responsibility of the State due to its consent or acquiescence,
with the latter cases incurring States’ ‘positive obligations’. The value in
separating out the different forms of positive obligations is in terms of
culpability. Z v the UK arguably differs from other cases characterised as
engaging the state’s ‘positive obligations’ such as X and Y v the Netherlands,
where the Dutch state failed to proscribe to a sufﬁcient extent the rape of a
mentally disabled individual and MC v Bulgaria where the Bulgarian state
was held responsible for its failure to ensure that all rapes were appropriately
investigated and proscribed by law. The difference is that in Z v the UK and
similar cases the State has been put on notice and, in failing to take action, the
State allowed the particular ill-treatment or torture to continue. In this way, the
140 ibid para 115. 141 ibid.
142 N Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, (2nd edn, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1999) 100, quoted in McCorquodale and La Forgia (n 124) 206.
143 As suggested by McCorquodale and La Forgia (n 124) 206.
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State has direct responsibility for the acts, and analogising this to the UN
Convention system, the state actor requirement therein would be fulﬁlled.
In relation to the offence of rape, this situation, in which the authorities
have cognizance of a known risk, is most likely to occur in the context of other
forms of sexual or gender-based violence, such as domestic abuse in the home.
This is an area in which is it well recognised that States are generally poor at
responding to instances of abuse brought to their attention. The increased level
of culpability attributed to a ‘consent or acquiescence’ ﬁnding of torture or ill-
treatment, may have an effect of ensuring greater cognizance is taken of re-
ports to the relevant State authorities. This situation is differentiated from one
in which a State has a ‘mere inability to act or lack of knowledge’ which
would not satisfy the current UN Convention standard of ‘consent or acqui-
escence’.144
Such circumstances differ from that in cases such as MC v Bulgaria where
the failings identiﬁed by the Court, relating to the legislative, administrative
and prosecutorial failings in respect of rapes not involving violence, applied
equally to all citizens. In this sense, it is a universal failing which existed
prior to any actual instance of abuse or harm in the case in question. In such
circumstances, where the State was unaware of a particular risk by non-state
actors, it cannot be held directly responsible for not preventing it. But it can be
held responsible for either administrative failings in terms of investigations
and/or for general inadequacies of the legislative framework. Thus, in MC v
Bulgaria the State was not held responsible for the alleged rape itself, but
merely for its failure to ensure an adequate investigation, as well as the State’s
failure to have in place the appropriate mechanisms for dealing with all forms
of rape: both options being described as the ‘next best thing’.145 On the con-
trary, following the analysis suggested, in Z v the UK the State would be held
directly responsible for the ill-treatment, with appropriate political and
ﬁnancial consequences.
This should not suggest that a ﬁnding that a State has violated its positive
obligations is not signiﬁcant. Indeed, it is possible to argue that it is only
through such rulings, if they effect the necessary changes at state level, that
real change and improvements will be generated. The situation is as stark as
Clapham has claimed:
‘If the national criminal system is unable or unwilling to prosecute certain acts of
violence, it becomes a matter for the European Court of Human Rights, which
will hold the state responsible for failing to protect individuals from non-state
actor violence by ineffectively securing their human rights.’146
To conclude this section, it has been argued that the Court is more ﬂuid in its
approach to determining whether torture, or ill-treatment, has been estab-
lished, than other human rights instruments. While all positive ﬁndings of
144 Edwards (n 5) 374. 145 Evans (n 18) 379. 146 Clapham (n 6) 376.
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torture to date have indeed involved State actors, there is no indication in the
jurisprudence that this is an essential criterion for a ﬁnding of torture. It was
then argued that the concept of positive obligations could usefully be devel-
oped so that where the State has been made aware of certain harms, or risk of
harm, it is held liable for direct acts of torture (or ill-treatment) on the basis
that it either consented or acquiesced in the treatment in question. Such a
development would follow, and develop, the approach of the UN Convention,
which the Court has been increasingly citing in recent cases. Such jur-
isprudential developments would ensure that States are held directly respon-
sible for acts of rape in a greater number of situations than is presently the
case. This direct responsibility for torture is important symbolically and has
jurisprudential and ﬁnancial implications. As Edwards has suggested, while
feminist criticism of the UN Convention deﬁnition of torture is valid, this is
not so much in relation to the fact that the claim has to be mounted against a
public ofﬁcial or the State, since this is a prerequisite for any human rights
violation under international law, but in relation to the fact that the concepts of
‘consent or acquiescence have failed to be interpreted in a sufﬁciently broad
manner’.147
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The United Nations has noted that ‘signiﬁcant efforts have been applied to
redeﬁne the meaning of human rights to encompass the speciﬁc experiences of
women’.148 Such efforts were successful in Aydin v Turkey which represented
a signiﬁcant triumph in ensuring recognition for the harm of rape as torture.
Yet, Aydin v Turkey was a paradigmatic torture case, perpetrated by a state
ofﬁcial, in State detention, for ostensibly political purposes. Since this judg-
ment, the Court has developed its jurisprudence on torture, and on sexual
violence, in a number of important ways. Speciﬁcally in relation to torture, the
Court has entrenched the purposive element of the deﬁnition of torture, at the
same time as retaining ﬂexibility in its approach and, most remarkably, has
alluded to the possibility of torture by private individuals. In its sexual viol-
ence case load, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the gravity of such
harms, recognising their assault on human dignity and autonomy, and as a
result has regularly found State responses totally inadequate.
Bringing these two strands of jurisprudence together, it is possible to be
optimistic about the future approach of the Court to cases of rape as torture.
Indeed, if the Court continues to develop its jurisprudence on torture, re-
cognizing torture beyond the paradigmatic, it will begin to address the varied
ways in which women are tortured and the fact that their torturers are so often
147 Edwards (n 5) 375.
148 Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission Resolution 1998/29,
18 December 1998, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/92, para 12, discussed in Clapham (n 6) 15.
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private individuals. Further, if the Court follows through its approach to
sexual violence, as constituting a key factor in women’s inequality and con-
tinuing as a result of societal and political failings, it will recognize that the
purpose of such violence is discriminatory. And, if the Court advances its
approach to state responsibility, demanding that states take greater steps to
both forestall the occurrence of human rights abuses and take concrete action
when informed of existing harms or risks of harm, more may be done to
prevent sexual violence and better procedures may be put in place to investi-
gate complaints and ensuring justice. My optimism is therefore contingent.
Nonetheless, there are clear grounds for hoping that the Court may once again,
as it did in Aydin v Turkey, show the international community the way forward
in treating rape as torture.
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